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.PESTICIDE USE AND PRODUCE QUALITY: EVALUATING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR INSTITUTIONS* 
Enrique E. Figueroa** 
"The consumer seeks more fresh or fresh-like product of good visual
 
quality that is full-flavored, nutritious, convenient to prepare and serve,
 
pesticide-free, and available year round at a reasonable price. At the
 
current state of the art, some of these goals are mutually exclusive, and
 
the marketplace will decide which goals will predominate" (Shewfelt,
 
p.105).
 
INTRODUCTION 
The above quote appeared in 1990 and has particular relevance to the development of this 
paper. It serves to identify produce attributes upon which consumers base their purchasing 
decisions and postulates the," ...mutually exclusive... ," nature of some attributes. Are the attributes 
mutually exclusive? Will the market place decide which attributes predominate? Can/should 
government intervention playa role or should the 'weeding' of the incompatible attributes be left 
entirely to the private sector? This paper will put forth a framework by which public and private 
sector individuals can evaluate the attribute culling process, if a culling process is warranted. 
Before proceeding, it is important to identify a term frequently used when discussing the 
issue of produce quality and pesticide use. The term is "cosmetic" and is usually used in the context 
of cosmetic defects on produce. The term gained prominence because the 1990 Farm Bill passed by 
Congress specifically uses it in directing the USDA to investigate the above mentioned relationship. 
However, there appears to be no consensus on what cosmetic means--i.e. at what point does a 
'blemish' cease to be a blemish and becomes a'rot'? Can USDA 'condition' grade standards be 
evaluated to ascertain which constitute a cosmetically based condition? Should USDA grade 
standards be the vehicles for evaluating cosmetic standards in produce? How does the produce 
industry--from producer to consumer--arrive at a consensus ofwhat is meant by cosmetic ­
, 
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standards? A need does exist to define what is meant by cosmetic standards, particularly how the 
definition will serve to answer the preceding questions. So far, no consensus has emerged to define 
cosmetic standards and a number of professionals now argue that the term is inappropriate and 
should not be used. 
Historically, the quality ofproduce has been ascertained by members of the trade through 
the use of USDA grade standards, label identification, and personal contacts and/or reputation. 
Consumers principally judge quality through appearance and the reputation and/or experience of 
shopping at a particular store. For the most part, both trade personnel and consumers have a 
consistent set of produce attributes that constitute quality. However, the use or non-use of 
pesticides in the production and distribution of produce is an area where trade personnel and 
consumers diverge in their relative assessments ofquality. Those consumers that discount produce 
quality because it has or was produced with the use of pesticides generally are at odds with trade 
personnel who generally do not discount quality because of pesticide use. It is perhaps this 
divergence ofquality assessment by these two market participants that is at the crux of the issue of 
produce quality and pesticide use. 
DIMENSIONS OF THE ISSUE 
The role private institutions play in determining a consensus on produce quality and 
pesticide use needs to be incorporated into and thereafter evaluated from a multi-dimensional 
perspective. The dimensions and key questions include: 
-How do regulatory dimensions affect pesticide use and produce quality?
 
-What is the appropriate framework for economic analysis of the issue?
 
-What role do consumer preferences play?
 
-What role does information transmitted by the market play?
 
-What are the social welfare gains?
 
A brief discussion follows regarding the possible answer(s) to the above questions, but more 
­
importantly the discussion attempts to frame the entire issue of pesticide use and produce quality 
from the perspective of the private sector. 
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Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory environment for producing and marketing produce is primarily 
governed under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the Agricultural Marketing Agreement of 1937, and the 
Pesticide Monitoring Improvements Act of 1988 (U.S. General Accounting Office, December 
1990). In addition, various states and/or market orders have other regulations specific to their 
jurisdictions. For example, the State ofMaine has pesticide labeling requirements for produce 
containers. Also, California has very restrictive statutes governing pesticide use (Greene and Zepp, 
p.l5). Given the multitude ofcurrent legislation on pesticide use, some form of new legislation 
would need to be introduced on how the definition ofproduce quality will incorporate pesticide use. 
Compounding the legislative debate will be issues raised by Dr. Bruce Ames at the University of 
California and his development of the "index for possible hazard," or HERP--human 
exposure/rodent potency index (Carter and Nuckton, p. 25). In short, Dr. Ames' perspective argues 
that commonly consumed items such as peanut butter and beer & wine pose more ofa cancer threat 
than, say, DDT. Therefore, judgments about regulating pesticides need to have a balanced 
perspective and one that recognizes life's everyday hazards. To what extent private sector 
institutions are effective in forming the debate concerning regulatory issues affecting produce 
quality will be a function of how the industry and environmental groups can define risk and risk 
assessment ofpesticides on produce. Indeed, agreeing on the appropriate risk assessment 
methodology for evaluating produce quality and pesticide use will be difficult--for environmental 
groups and produce industry groups have very different positions on what the appropriate 
methodology should be. 
Framework For Economic Analysis 
As just mentioned, the evaluation of risk and risk assessment is a key parameter in -

formulating pesticide use policy. Incorporating risk into an economic analysis framework is just as 
important, but unfortunately the current body of literature does not provide a rich foundation for 
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conducting sound economic analyses. Research is particularly lacking in the area of how firms 
and/or industry can make a determination oftheir optimal allocation of resources in a 'risky' 
environment. On the demand side, the incorporation of, say, 'pesticide residue free' as an attribute 
of produce has more literature supporting the approach. 
The analytical methodologies which have been (can be) used to evaluate pesticides in/on 
produce are: 
1.) The Houthakker-Thiel Model 
2.) The Lancaster Model 
3.) The Consumer Goods Characteristic Model 
4.) The Willingness-To-Pay Approach 
5.) The Reputation Setting Model 
6.) Conjoint Analysis 
7.) Consumer and Producer Surplus Modeling 
The Houthakker-Thiel Model incorporates both quantities and qualities--i.e. pesticide residue free 
as an attribute--of goods in a utility function. The Lancaster Model defines goods in a utility 
function as a bundle ofcharacteristics--one would be the level ofpesticide residues on particular 
tomatoes. The Consumer Goods Characteristic Model is a variant of the Lancaster Model and 
defines goods as having both common and unique characteristics--no pesticide residues in a 
particular brandllabel oflettuce, for example (Morse and Eastwood). Some form of the preceding 
three models can yield a hedonic price function and such a function can directly estimate the implicit 
price(s) ofattributes--i.e. pesticide residue free. An application of the Lancaster Model to evaluate 
the effect of the "Alar Scare" on apple sales in the Metropolitan New York City area found that 
information about the scare had a significant impact (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn). An application 
ofa hedonic price equation to estimate implicit prices for selected quality attributes of tomatoes 
found differences across months of the year and across tomato attributes. Ofthe four attributes 
estimated, color, damage, firmness, and size, damage was the only attribute significant in all three 
time periods evaluated (Jordan, et all. 
-
The above mentioned models are applicable to varying degrees. However, if data could be 
'" 
obtained on quantities and prices ofproduce with varying levels of pes~icide related attributes, then 
the hedonic price equation model can yield sound and possibly robust results. For private firms, this 
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approach would yield estimates of price, income, and cross-price elasticities of demand and 
therefore allow firms to make better decisions concerning pricing and item availability. 
Consumer Preferences 
Ofthe six dimensions listed, the consumer preference dimension is the most 
researched. Though most work falls under the general category of 'Food Safety', a good amount of 
work has been conducted to ascertain consumer preferences for produce quality and its relationship 
to pesticide use. The statistic that the U.S. uses 45% of all pesticide production on only 7% ofthe 
cultivated land in the world may be at the root ofconsumer concerns about pesticides in food (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, p. 12). Also, there is evidence that the level of concern about 
pest,icide use on produce has changed over time. In 1965, 41.5% of surveyed consumers indicated 
that a danger existed in eating fruits and vegetables that had been sprayed or dusted with pesticides. 
By 1984, the comparable percentage had changed to 71.1% (Sachs, et ai, p. 103). Conversely, a 
study of male and female Black and non-Black consumers indicates males think today's food is 
safer. However, the majority of females believe today's food is less safe (Jordan and Elnagheeb, p. 
20). 
Much of the work in the area of produce quality and pesticide use has used willingness to 
pay approaches. The prevalence of the approach emanates from the fact that many (most) 
consumers have not purchased produce which was produced and marketed under varying levels of 
pesticide use. The other factor contributing to the popularity of the approach is that researchers 
have been interested in determining consumer trade-oft's between pesticide use and the appearance 
ofproduce--i.e. surface defects and/or perceived damage. A large majority of shoppers in the 
Atlanta Metropolitan market indicated some concern about pesticide use in produce. However, 
61.5% of the respondents were not willing to accept cosmetic damage or insect damage--88.4%-­
on the produce they purchase even though the majority were willing to pay 5% more for pesticide­ ­
free produce (Ott). Another study indicates that 56% of respondents are willing to pay 10% or 
more for pesticide-free tomatoes, but less than half are willing to purchase tomatoes with cosmetic 
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defects. In addition, respondents--43%--indicated that their buying behavior with respect to 
produce changed due to their concern about pesticides. Of the individuals that changed their 
purchase behavior, 41 % buy more organic and/or chemical free produce, while 22% stopped 
buying produce (Weaver, et al). Lastly, demographic characteristics affect consumers willingness 
to pay for certified pesticide residue free produce. The characteristics that positively influence the 
willingness to pay are: if the consumer values the testing ofproduce, if the consumer expects to be 
financially better off in the future, and if the consumer is White (vs. Black). The negative influences 
are: if consumers are in the 36-60 age group category, have a college education, and have incomes 
less than $35,000 (Misra, et a1). 
How the market place incorporates the above information on consumer preference for 
produce with varying degrees of pesticide use will determine the extent to which government 
intervention will be needed. If the market place provides a variety ofproduce that satisfies varying 
consumer needs, then the likelihood ofgovernment intervention is diminished. A key component of 
satisfying different consumers is the ability of the market to transmit information between all market 
participants. 
Information Transmitted by the Market 
The most likely choice for transmitting market information about the use of 
pesticides in the production and distribution of produce is through brands and/or labels. However, 
an impediment to this approach is the perceived notion by producers and retailers that labeling a 
produce item as pesticide residue free or organic connote that the other produce items without such 
labels may not be safe. Also, the ability ofa producer to maintain label/brand integrity as it moves 
along the market channel may not be very secure--once the producer sells the produce he/she has 
lost control of it. Moreover, consumers seem to have a relatively low level ofconfidence on the 
food industry for supplying information on food safety (Kramer and Penner, p.24). Nonetheless, ­
the market place has and continues to support various forms ofbrandingilabeling with respect to 
pesticides. A key question is the extent to which labelslbrands can segment or differentiate produce 
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based on the level of pesticides used in its production and distribution. 
The debate on whether USDA produce grade standards can/should be changed to 
incorporate information about pesticide use is perhaps a response to the inability of the current 
marketing system to transmit such information. The debate is useful in that various alternatives 
have surfaced--change standards; amend current grades; or a re-definition ofwhat grade standards 
should provide to the market place (Armbruster). In addition, the debate and future research needs 
to consider: 
A.) Who derives information from grade standards? 
B.) Have grade standards adapted to increased trade? 
C.) What is the relationship between "information demand and 
"consumer demand"? 
D.) Can a consensus be generated on an new set of grade standards? 
The importance of the transmission of information by the market cannot be overemphasized and a 
number of researchers have specifically looked at this issue. One effort found very significant 
changes in consumers' willingness to buy oranges with tOOp damage after they were told that the 
thrip damaged oranges were produced with half the pesticides ofconventionally produced oranges 
(Lynch). Another study found that information plays a significant role in the outcome from the 
model. Consumers stated preferences for willingness to pay and/or buy produce with labels such as; 
organically grown, certified organically grown, pesticide residue tested, and IPM grown were a 
function ofhow well informed consumers were about the meaning of such labels (Underhill and 
Figueroa). In fact, the role information plays in determining the outcome of a particular form of 
analysis is critical, particularly in willingness to pay approaches. An extensive survey of shoppers in 
food stores in North Carolina found that shoppers did respond to information about the level of 
health risk associated with pesticide residues on produce. In addition, the information affect was a 
function of the amount of information shoppers had about produce prices (Bom). Information can 
have both supply-side and demand-side effects. On the demand-side, the effect of information on 
-

consumer demand is a function of; a.) information search; b.) knowledge; and c.) quality ofchoice 
(price, et a1). Lastly, an application ofconjoint analysis found that the. order ofhow respondents 
viewed pictures of bibb lettuce with varying levels of price, packaging, and pesticide-free labels 
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influenced their response (Stevenson). 
The author is unaware of studies investigating industry-wide affects of produce 
labelslbrands. However, a model developed to evaluate quality reputation appears to be an 
appropriate vehicle for analyzing the impact of the reputation of produce labelslbrands on firm and 
market performance (Shapiro). 
Welfare Gains 
Though this is the most appropriate model for evaluating gains and losses by society, 
the lack ofdata renders the approach empirically inoperable. However, from a purely theoretical 
perspective, one study indicates that minimum quality standards which are discernible to consumers 
upon inspection cannot increase social welfare (Bockstael). Another puts forth the notion (counter­
intuitive, perhaps) that producers could actually gain from pesticide restrictions if output product 
prices increase enough (Abler). Also, economy-wide effects concerning pesticide use are invariably 
based on information supplied by the scientific community and their track record appears to 
overestimate both the risks and benefits from pesticide use (Harper). 
The preceding discussion on the dimensions of produce quality and pesticides use also needs 
to be couched within the existing produce marketing system. The section that follows will attempt 
to describe the produce marketing system and its ability to provide information about pesticide use 
and produce quality. 
THE PRODUCE MARKETING SYSTEM 
First, it is imperative that industry representatives and consumer voices be heard in the 
debate of pesticide use and produce quality. All market participants can gain if the market truly 
reflects the needs of participants, but all participants can lose if discord and suspicion dominate the 
debate. Before proceeding, the market system needs to be identified and the following is a ­
simplistic depiction of the produce marketing industry. 
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Producers Market intermediaries 
----Industry organizations/associations ----Brokers 
----Market order commission representatives ----Receivers 
----Board members ofcooperative ----Wholesalers 
----Private firms ----Commission merchants 
Retailers Consumers 
----Supermarkets ----Consumer organizations 
----Independent grocery stores ----Environmental groups 
----Health food stores ----Foodservice establishments 
----Direct market sales ---Individuals 
An important issue to producers is the availability and cost of pesticides. The process of 
pesticide registration is costly. The cost can be as high as $25 million (American Council for 
Science and Health, pp. 23-25). Another estimate is $40 to $60 million (Council for Agricultural 
Sciences and Technology, pp. 8-9). More importantly, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) is reviewing a number of key pesticides for fiuit and vegetable producers and a possible 
outcome is the removal of some pesticides from the market. A critical issue in the re-registration 
process is the EPA's policy of "acceptable risk"--one additional cancer per one million population. 
Also, the debate concerning the EPA's policy ofusing "economic benefits to farmers" as part of its 
evaluation process has been heated and may likely change (League ofWomen Voters Educational 
Fund, pp. 6-9). 
Another aspect of the debate is the relationship between commodity programs such as 
market orders or set-aside programs. Unfortunately, relatively little work has been done looking at 
the direct link between grade and size provisions ofmarket orders and the use of pesticides to meet 
such provisions. However, there is some evidence that provisions of the Florida market order for 
tomatoes grades are not consistent with consumer preferences for quality (Sun and Conklin). An 
effort that looked specifically at the impact ofchanging U.S. grain sector policy found that pesticide 
use would decline after implementing various policies. Also, output product price would increase 
and input prices would decline (Helmers and Azzan). 
A number of questions will remain unanswered if and when some pesticides are removed ­
from the market. For example, will pesticide manufacturers stop production of certain pesticides? 
Is there any level of oncogenic risk from pesticides that is acceptable? Will consumers accept more 
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blemishes on produce in order to have fewer pesticides applied (Gianessi and Greene)? Lastly, 
producer decisions on applying pesticides have and need to continue to incorporate considerations 
about the safety offann workers (Schaub, p. 2). 
Market intermediaries and retailers probably derive the greatest benefits from the current 
information transmitted through USDA produce grade standards. Conversely, one could argue that 
these two entities stand to lose the most if the grade standards are changed. Market intermediaries 
and retail produce buyers playa very important role in determining the type of produce attributes 
demanded in the market. Even though most would argue that the consumer ultimately decides what 
produce attributes the market will supply, other decisions by market intermediaries and retailers can 
playas large or larger role. For example, a wholesaler's decision on buying full or mixed loads from 
a distance supplier may likely be a function of transportation costs, the relative perishability & 
compatibility of the items in the mixed load, the prior or future 'deals' cut between the wholesaler 
and supplier, whether the supplier is willing to provide volume discounts, the shelf-life left in the 
produce items when the wholesaler receives it, and other factors not entirely related to consumer 
preferences. The retail produce buyer generally operates in a climate which requires particular 
levels of sales and profits over a specified time period. Again, the produce buyer's decision to carry 
items and/or allocate more or less shelf space incorporates factors such as: what the competition is 
doing; what items are or will be on ad; whether a produce item is short or long a particular week; 
prior or future 'deals' cut with produce suppliers; how to display a particular produce item--i.e. end­
of-isle; or promotions sponsored by commodity organizations. In fact, organic produce suppliers 
argue that retail produce buyers have curtailed the expansion of the market by their merchandising 
and space allocation decisions concerning the display oforganic produce. 
Conversely, retailers who initially were advertising pesticide residue free produce no longer 
do so because of potential liabilities from 'truth in advertising' statutes. Also, retailers state that 
organic produce costs more than what their average shoppers are willing to pay for it and therefore ­
it is not a profitable item for retailers to carry. Since large supermarket retailers now by-pass 
market intermediaries and buy directly from produce shippers, the role of market intermediaries is 
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more important in the small retail market channel. The smal.l retailer market channel generally has 
higher prices for all items because volumes are smaller and overhead is higher. Therefore, carrying 
relatively higher priced produce-organics--is more difficult. The notion that organic produce is 
more expensive is not universally true, however. 
There is no doubt that the current debate about produce quality and pesticide use is a result 
of efforts by environmental groups and consumer organizations. Their position at the table 
discussing pesticide use policy has up to now been vacant, but there will be no such vacancy in the 
future. A relatively silent entity has been the foodservice industry, but the potential for this industry 
to playa significant role in the debate between produce quality and pesticide use is large. A vehicle 
for change is the foodservice industry's practice ofcontracting with suppliers. In addition, the fact 
that foodservice firms generally represent large volume purchases adds clout to their ability to 
influence market outcomes. For example, a foodservice operator can require (some do already) 
from their suppliers that produce meet a particular level of pesticide use in the production and 
distribution ofthe produce. Because the relative cost ofproduce for a foodservice establishment is 
low, the firm can afford to pay a higher price for produce meeting pesticide use (non-use) 
requirements. From the supplier's perspective, entering a contract minimizes market risk and 
therefore he/she is more amenable to meet varying criteria for hislher produce. Demographic 
variables also contribute to the foodservice industry's ability to wield more market power in the 
future. More individuals are eating from menus prepared for larger and expanding populations-­
nursing homes, prisons, consolidation of school and municipal districts, more cafeterias at work 
sites and/or offices, etc.and therefore the director offoodservice for a chain of nursing homes 
represents a larger and expanding market. 
Lastly, the trend in the consumption of produce continues to be upward and the primary 
reason for increased consumption is health/nutrition (The Packer, p. 16). The advent of the 5-A­
Day-Program will contribute to the trend and will most likely accelerate it. The current U.S. ­
population is eating 3.4 servings per day offruits and vegetables and therefore meeting the goal of 
5-servings represents an increase of32% (Subar, et ai, p.2). 
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SUMMATION 
Private sector institutions will playa diminished role in the debate concerning produce 
quality and pesticide use. Indeed, the Clinton Administration has just announced a policy to reduce 
the amount of pesticides used in the production offood (The New York Times, front page). This is 
not to say that the private sector will play an insignificant role, but rather that the industry's share of 
the policy setting 'pie' will be smaller. However, the total market for produce has and will likely 
continue to increase and therefore the relative health of the industry is not in jeopardy. What is in 
jeopardy is the industry's ability to be the primary (sole) user and therefore the primary entity that 
will continue to define USDA produce grade standards. Along with the loss of being the 'primary 
user' ofUSDA grade standards, will be the loss of the responsible ofbeing the sole payee for the 
USDA grade standards system. Consumers and other market participants will most likely have to 
bare some of the costs ofchanging USDA produce grade standards. 
It is not a foregone conclusion that USDA grade standards need changing, but what is clear 
is that !2.!!!.£ system needs to be implemented that transmits pesticide use and produce quality 
information through the marketing channel(s). Since current grade standards serve the function of 
transmitting produce quality information along the marketing channel, then many market 
participants, particularly consumers, feel it is also the appropriate vehicle for transmitting 
information on pesticide use. However, before embarking on such a course, research needs to be 
conducted on what is meant by "cosmetic standards" and the appropriateness of the current grade 
system to inform all market participants of such standards. More specifically, future research on the 
relationship between pesticide use and cosmetic standards needs to ask the following: 
1.) To what extent do cosmetic standards lead to greater/lesser food 
contamination? 
2.) How, if at all, do cosmetic standards increase human poisoning? 
3.) To what extent do cosmetic standards contribute to environmental 
pollution? 
4.) To what extent do cosmetic standards increase energy use in produce 
production? ­
5.) To what extent do cosmetic standards in/decrease produce costs to 
consumers (Pimentel, et a1)? 
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Two final points warrant identification for further research. The first is the relationship 
between the 5-A-Day-Program and the ability of low income consumers to have sufficient funds to 
purchase 5-servings-a-day. Will the 5-A-Day-Program increase demand to the point where 
produce prices increase significantly? This is a particularly relevant question if the EPA's re­
registration process removes a number of pesticides from the market which results in decreased 
supply. The second point is related to the first. What level of future U.S. consumption of produce 
be produced outside the U.S.? The issue has particular relevance to pesticide use and produce 
quality because of the 'set' of pesticides available to foreign producers which may not be available to 
domestic producers. For example, if a particularly effective pesticide which breaks down quickly 
after use (i.e. not found on the actual produce at the time it is imported) is only available to foreign 
producers, then can domestic producers claim a competitive disadvantage? Or, will the imported 
produce help keep prices low and available to low income consumers? 
The paper began with a quote and it concludes with another that identifies a potential 
vehicle for addressing the issue of produce quality and pesticide use. In fact, it reflects on changes 
that are already taking found in the market place. 
"Brand labeling of fresh produce•••may provide the necessary vehicle 
for changing consumer orientation from an emphasis on appearance to 
less pesticide use, particularly if the label can serve as a guarantor of 
consistently high consumption quality" (Shewfelt, p.l05). 
-
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